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Comissão Preparatória das Nações Unidas

Londres, em 31 de outubro de 1945.

A.S.E. DOS NEGÓCIOS ESTRANGEIROS
GABINETE DE COMUNICAÇÕES
21 NOV 1945
17368

Nº 28

Recomendações do Comité nº 8
(Relaçoes com entidades especializadas)

602.(04)

Senhor Ministro,

Tenho a honra de passar às mãos de Vossa Excelência o relatório do Senhor Everaldo D. de Lima, relativo à recomendação do Comité nº 8, tal como, ao cabo, a adotou o Comité Executivo.

1/1

2. Sob pressão da Delegação soviética, o Comité Executivo concordou, por voto unânime, do qual se abstiveram as Delegações do Brasil e do Iran, em que a recomendação à Comissão Preparatória se limitasse à transmissão, sem aprová-las nem desaprová-las, das observações do Comité nº 8.

3. Minha abstenção foi intencional e compreendida. Intencional por causa de não querer eu ceder, conforme desejava a Delegação soviética, que ao cabo triunfou, na transmissão pura e simples das recomendações do Comité nº 8 à Comissão Preparatória. Compreendida por causa de terem tôdos os membros do Comité Executivo percebido que meu voto derivava da declara-

A Sua Excelência o Senhor P. Leão Velloso,
Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores.

T.G.

declaração em favor da manutenção da Repartição Internacional do Trabalho tal qual ela é hoje.

Aproveito a oportunidade para renovar a Vossa Excelência os protestos da minha respeitosa consideração.



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Comissão Preparatória das Nações Unidas

Londres, em 31 de outubro de 1945.

s/n

Recomendações do Comité nº 8
(Agências especializadas)

Senhor Embaixador,

Tenho a honra de passar às mãos de Vossa Excelência o incluso texto da recomendação do Comité Executivo, relativa à transmissão à Assembléia Geral, pela Comissão Preparatória, das observações do Comité nº 8, o qual ficou encarregado de examinar as relações entre as Nações Unidas e as agências especializadas, nos termos do artigo nº 57 da Carta das Nações Unidas.

1/1

2. O relatório do Comité nº 8 não foi aprovado pelo Comité Executivo, o qual, por proposta da Delegação soviética, limitou-se a recomendar a sua transmissão como observações sôbre as relações com as agências especializadas.

3. Essa decisão só foi alcançada por espirito de conciliação das demais Delegações, depois de longa e acalorada discussão, em que o representante do Reino Unido (Ministro Noel Baker), ocupante da cadeira presidencial, contestou os argu-

A Sua Excelência o Senhor Embaixador C. de Freitas-Valle,
Representante do Brasil na Comissão Preparatória das Nações Unidas.

T.G.

argumentos especiosos do delegado russo (Embaixador Gromyko).

4. Os trabalhos do Comité nº 8 foram a príncipio perturbados pelo falecimento do seu primeiro Presidente e subsequente renuncia do segundo Presidente. O delegado francês, Senhor Aglion, foi entretanto uma excelente escolha como terceiro Presidente, e as dissenções da União Soviética não lograram travar demasiadamente a marcha dos trabalhos. As objeções russas diziam respeito principalmente à inclusão da Repartição Internacional do Trabalho entre as agências especializadas mas não ficaram explicitas nem foram largamente expostas ou defendidas pelo representante soviético. O relatório foi unanimemente aprovado pelo Comité nº 8.

5. Em sua consideração das relações orçamentárias e de outras disposições, o Comité timbrou sempre em não despertar suscetibilidades no seio das agências especializadas, afim de facilitar as negociações que deverão ser empreendidas pelo Consêlho Econômico e Social.

Aproveito a oportunidade para renovar a Vossa Excelência os protestos da minha respeitosa consideração.

P. D. Lima

Com. Prep. NU/c/n/1945/Anexo Unico.

CHAPTER VIII. THE SPECIALISED AGENCIES

Section 1: Recommendation to Transmit (without approval or disapproval) Observations on the Relationships with specialized Agencies.

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,

CONSIDERING that developments concerning specialised agencies are in a very fluid state, and that it is impracticable at this time to examine in detail the various degrees of relationship which might be proposed for each of the specialized agencies, and,

CONSIDERING that the Interim Arrangements establishing the Preparatory Commission do not require the Commission to make recommendations concerning the relationship of the specialized agencies to the United Nations,

RECOMMENDS: that the Observations Concerning the Relationships with Specialised Agencies (Part III, Chapter VIII, Section 2) should eventually be transmitted by the Preparatory Commission to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Section 2: Observations on Relationships with Specialised Agencies

Introduction

1. The objectives of the United Nations in the realm of economic and social co-operation and the effective functioning of the specialised agencies will be more fully realised if a close relationship and co-ordination is established between them. The agreements to be concluded between the United Nations and the specialized agencies should furnish a basic arrangement which will facilitate the realisation of these objectives and enable the United Nations and each of the specialised agencies to discharge their responsibilities in their respective fields.

Interpretation of Article 57 of the Charter.

2. It is considered that Article 57 of the Charter makes it mandatory upon the Organisation and upon Members of the United Nations to undertake to bring into relationship with it the various specialised agencies established by inter-governmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields. This consideration applies not only to existing agencies of this character but also to those which may hereafter be established. The report of the Rapporteur of Committee II/3 at the San Franscisco Conference indicates that this article should not be regarded as precluding the Economic and Social Council from "negotiating at its discretion, subject to the approval of the General Assembly, agreements bringing other types of inter-governmental agencies into relationship with the Organisation". Accordingly, in addition to negotiating agreements with the specialised agencies which have wide international responsibilities, the Economic and Social Council may, at its discretion, negotiate agreements with such other inter-governmental agencies, including those of a regional character, as are not considered

as being within the definition of Article 57, but which it is desirable to bring into relationship. +

Agencies to be Brought into Relationship.

3. It is considered that the various existing specialised agencies should be brought into relationship with the United Nations at the earliest practicable moment, and that other agencies whose establishment is contemplated should be brought into relationship immediately upon their establishment. No reference, however, has been made to the specific agencies which might be brought into relationship.

Alternative Arrangements for Certain Bureaux or Agencies.

4. With regard to the large number of independent bureaux and agencies which were functioning before the war, it is believed that more suitable organisational arrangements could be made for the exercise of the functions hitherto entrusted to many of them. It may be desirable for some of these bureaux or agencies to continue to function and to be brought into relationship with the United Nations. In a few cases, the process of merging pre-war agencies with newly established agencies is already taking place. It is considered that the total number of older agencies should be reduced and brought into a more rational and unified organisational structure. The following alternatives might be followed in achieving this end:

(a) liquidation of the bureau or agency with a transfer of some or all of its functions to a specialised agency;

(b) liquidation of the agency and arrangements made for the exercise of its functions under appropriate commissions or committees within the United Nations;

(c) merger with another inter-governmental agency.

Functions not Entrusted to Existing Agencies.

5. There are certain fields in which international co-operation and organisation are not fully developed and which are not at present envisaged as coming within the jurisdiction of any specialised agency. The following alternatives are available to the United Nations for handling such matters:

+ NOTE The term "inter-governmental agency" is used in its widest sense to include all agencies established by inter-governmental agreement whether they are to be brought into relationship or not. The term specialised agency is used to designate the particular type of inter-governmental agency coming within the definition of Article 57, that is, having wide international responsibilities as defined in its basic instrument.

(a) the initiation of negotiations among the states concerned for the creation of a new specialised agency, in accordance with Article 59 of the Charter;

(b) the establishment of a commission or committee by the Economic and Social Council;

(c) the creation of a subsidiary organ by the General Assembly, in accordance with Article 22 of the Charter;

(d) a recommendation by the Economic and Social Council to an existing specialised or other inter-governmental agency to undertake additional functions.

Recommendations to Members of the United Nations on Relationships.

6. It is observed that there might be an interval between the establishment of the United Nations and the conclusion of agreements with the specialised agencies to be brought into relationship with it. The Economic and Social Council may wish to make recommendations during that period to Members of the United Nations concerning the agreements to be concluded with specialised agencies, or with regard to other matters pertaining to their relationship. Recommendations on these and other matters can be made by the Economic and Social Council under the general powers conferred on it in Articles 62 and 66 of the Charter.

7. The items set forth in the following paragraphs comprise subjects which are deemed appropriate either for inclusion in the agreements or for suitable action by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council. Some of these items are derived from the provisions of the Charter, namely: reciprocal representation (Article 70); exchange of information and documents (Article 64); co-ordination commission of the Economic and Social Council (Articles 63 and 68); recommendations to the specialised agencies (Articles 58, 62 and 63); reports (Article 64); decisions of the Security Council (Article 48); assistance to the Trusteeship Council (Article 91); requests for advisory opinions (Article 96); requests for information by the Court (Article 34 of the Statute of the Court); budgetary and financial relationships (Article 17). There are other subjects, which, though not emanating directly from the Charter, are considered important in the general plan of relationships with the specialised agencies. These comprise subjects listed under the following headings: liaison, proposal of agenda items, rules of procedure, common fiscal services, personnel arrangements, privileges and immunities, administrative tribunal, technical services, central statistical service and location of headquarters. It is considered that all or most of the items enumerated in both categories should figure in the agreements with those specialised agencies whose range of functions with regard to economic, social or related matters is extensive, but that all these subjects should not necessarily figure in the agreements with specialised agencies whose range of functions is less extensive.

Reciprocal Representation.

8. The principle of reciprocal representation as provided for in Article 70 of the Charter is considered as one of the effective means of securing close relationships between the specialised agencies

and the United Nations and of furthering the co-ordination of their activities. The Economic and Social Council is empowered by this article to arrange for representatives of the specialised agencies to participate, without vote, in its deliberations and in those of its commissions, and for its representatives to participate in the deliberations of the specialised agencies. The exact nature of these arrangements will vary according to the nature of the specialised agency and the character of its relationship to the United Nations. Those of relatively limited scope might normally participate only in meetings of the appropriate commissions and attend the Council only when specially invited. Arrangements with other agencies of more general scope might provide that they be represented in the Council when certain classes of questions are being examined. It may also be desirable to provide that a few of the most important agencies whose range of interest is wide should be represented regularly at Council meetings. Provision should also be made in the agreements for representatives of the Economic and Social Council to participate in the meetings of the policy-making and executive bodies or conferences of the specialised agencies.

9. In view of the powers of recommendation which are conferred on the General Assembly in the field of economic and social co-operation and the functions which it is to exercise with respect to the budgets of specialised agencies, there may be occasions when the General Assembly will consider it desirable to invite representatives of some of the specialised agencies to participate, without vote, in its deliberations. Representation in the committees of the General Assembly will clearly be desirable when matters of direct concern to the agencies are being discussed. It is considered that the silence of the Charter with respect to such participation does not preclude the General Assembly from making provision in its rules of procedure for representation of this character, nor from authorising the Economic and Social Council to include an appropriate provision pertaining thereto in the agreements with certain of the specialised agencies.

Exchange of Information and Documents.

10. A full exchange of information and documents on all relevant questions is an essential condition of co-operation and co-ordination, and an appropriate provision pertaining thereto should be inserted in the agreements with all specialised agencies.

Liaison.

11. While it is anticipated that most specialised agencies will have their headquarters at the seat of the United Nations, some may not. If any of the more important agencies are located elsewhere it would be desirable for them to maintain permanent liaison officers at the headquarters of the United Nations. Similarly, the Economic and Social Council might find it useful to maintain liaison officers at the headquarters of such agencies.

Participation of the Specialised Agencies in the Activities of a Co-ordination Commission of the Economic and Social Council.

12. Certain matters of organisation which are of interest to both the specialised agencies and the United Nations could be effectively dealt with by a co-ordination commission of the Economic and Social Council

which would include in its membership the chief executives of the specialised agencies, or their deputies, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General or his deputy. It is suggested that the functions of this proposed commission include, in particular, such matters as those referred to in paragraphs 13 and 14 below.

13. The large number of periodic conferences and meetings of governing boards and commissions of specialised agencies, together with the regular meetings of the principal organs and subsidiary bodies of the United Nations, will require careful scheduling in order to permit full and adequate representation in all of them. The preparation of a schedule which should, so far as possible, group the periodic meetings of related bodies and take account of any special conferences or ad hoc meetings would be of considerable practical value to member governments in planning their representation, and to the bodies concerned in planning their work.

14. It is recognised that arrangements for inter-agency co-operation will be developed, as envisaged in the constitutions of several of the specialised agencies. Such arrangements might usefully be reviewed, in the first instance, by the Co-ordination Commission to enable that body to advise the Economic and Social Council whether such arrangements adequately take into account the interests of any other specialised agencies which may not be parties to them. The specialised agencies should undertake to inform the Economic and Social Council of the nature and scope of any inter-agency arrangements to which they may be parties.

Proposal of Agenda Items.

15. Arrangements for the inclusion on the agenda of the conferences and executive bodies of the specialised agencies of items proposed by the Economic and Social Council would facilitate the consideration of recommendations made by the Council and the General Assembly. The specialised agencies on their part should be granted the privilege of proposing items for the agenda of the Economic and Social Council. A provision embodying such arrangements might be included in the agreements.

Rules of procedure.

16. In view of the advantages to be gained by the establishment of a common code of rules of procedure for all international meetings, it is hoped that when such a code is adopted by the United Nations, the various specialised agencies will adopt it so far as possible.

Recommendations of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.

17. Articles 58, 62 and 63 of the Charter emphasise the power of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council to make recommendations to the specialised agencies both with regard to the co-ordination of their policies and activities and with respect to "international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters". With a view to assuring appropriate consideration of these recommendations, the agreements with all agencies should include an undertaking on their part :

(a) to place any recommendations made to them by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council before their governing bodies or other appropriate organs as soon as possible;

(b) to arrange for any necessary consultations on matters pertaining to such recommendations;

(c) to report in due course on the steps taken to give effect to such recommendations (Article 64);

(d) in general, to co-operate with the United Nations for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Reports.

18. In addition to the special reports referred to in paragraph 17 above, the agreements with all specialised agencies should include an undertaking by them to furnish regular reports as envisaged in Article 64 of the Charter. The frequency and character of such reports should be set forth in the agreement with each agency.

Decisions of the Security Council.

19. In Article 48 Members of the United Nations have accepted the obligation to carry out decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security "through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members". This Article should be implemented by the insertion of a suitable provision in the agreements with the specialised agencies in which they would undertake to assist the Security Council, upon its request, in the application of measures envisaged in Article 41 of the Charter.

Assistance to the Trusteeship Council.

20. Article 91 of the Charter provides that "the Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail itself of the assistance of the Economic and Social Council and of the specialised agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively concerned". In view of the broad economic and social objectives of the trusteeship system, laid down in Article 76, a suitable provision should be made in the agreements with the agencies concerned in which they would undertake to render assistance when so requested. Such a provision might include arrangements for the representation of such specialised agencies on appropriate occasions.

Requests for Advisory Opinions.

21. Paragraph 2 of Article 96 of the Charter provides that "... specialised agencies, which may at any time be so authorised by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities", and the Report of the Rapporteur of Committee IV/1 of the San Francisco Conference, contains the following statement:

"The First Committee desired also that at least a restricted competence to make requests should be conferred on public international organisations. A general proposal to this effect was not adopted by the First Committee, but in line with a decision taken by the Second Committee of the Second Commission, it is proposed that the Charter should enable the General Assembly to authorise any organ of the Organisation and any specialised agency brought into relationship with it to request an opinion on legal questions arising within the scope of its activities".

22. In the light of these provisions, it will be for the General Assembly to decide whether a general authorization, if requested, should be given to any of the specialised agencies to enable them to make requests for advisory opinions directly to the Court without recourse to the General Assembly in each instance. The General Assembly should also consider whether a provision relating to a general authorization should be included in the initial or subsidiary agreements with the agencies concerned. It is assumed that the General Assembly could at any time revoke a general authorization.

23. It is considered that the Economic and Social Council should be immediately informed whenever a request is made for an advisory opinion by any specialised agency acting under a general authorization and that a provision to that effect should be included in the agreements with the agencies concerned.

24. It will also be for the General Assembly to determine, in granting a general authorization, whether it wishes to attach any conditions, e.g., a condition as to the duration of the authorization or as to obtaining the prior approval of the Economic and Social Council in each case.

Requests for Information by the Court.

25. Article 34 of the Statute of the Court empowers the Court to request of public international organisations information relevant to cases before it. A suitable article in the agreements with all specialised agencies should include an undertaking by them to furnish the information requested under the terms of the Statute.

Budgetary and Financial Relationships.

26. Paragraph 3 of Article 17 of the Charter confers on the General Assembly two functions: first, to "consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialised agencies referred to in Article 57"; and second, to "examine the administrative budgets of such specialised agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned". The general intention and object of both parts of this paragraph have been examined. It is not considered that there was any intention to confer on the General Assembly a financial power which could be used by it to control the policies of the specialised agencies. Relationships between the specialised agencies and the General Assembly on policy matters are dealt with in other articles of the Charter. The primary object of paragraph 3 of Article 17 is to encourage and develop a large measure of fiscal and administrative co-ordination in the interest of greater operating

efficiency and economy for the entire structure of the Organisation and the specialised agencies related to it. Each specialised agency would benefit from a close scrutiny by the General Assembly of the administrative budgets of all such agencies. Member governments required to share the increasing costs of international organisation would be assured that precautions had been taken against avoidable duplication of effort and expense.

27. It is considered that the first part of paragraph 3 of Article 17 envisages varying degrees of relationship, from complete financial integration downwards, and that the second part is conceived as the minimum degree of relationship on the budgetary and financial side which should be included in the agreements with the specialised agencies. It may be convenient, therefore, to consider the second part, which is mandatory, first.

28. The meaning of the term "administrative budget" has given rise to some discussion. It was suggested that the use of the term might have been intended to underline the point made in paragraph 26 above, that it was the intention that the budgets should be examined from the angle of good administration and not of policy. It was also pointed out that there is clearly an area of possible expenditures - such as the relief operations of U.N.R.R.A. and the technical operations of the Bank and the Fund - which would not be suitable for this kind of examination. Even in such cases, however, the administrative costs of salary, office expenses and general expenditure of a recurring character, are comparable to those of other agencies, and their examination may lead to fruitful comparisons and contrasts. It is considered that the term ought not to be given a restrictive interpretation.

29. It follows that all agreements with specialised agencies should include a provision referring to the power of the General Assembly to examine and made recommendations concerning their administrative budgets and set forth a procedure for its implementation. The Supervisory Committee for Administrative and Budgetary Questions would be the natural body to make the initial examination on behalf of the General Assembly. (See Chapter VII, Section 1, paragraph 5). The representatives of specialised agencies should have a right to attend the meetings of the Supervisory Committee whenever their respective budgets are under consideration. Where possible, the recommendations of the General Assembly should be made before, rather than after, the budget has been finally adopted by the constitutional organ of a specialised agency.

30. The first part of paragraph 3 of Article 17, however, envisages the possibility of a much closer integration, and it is assumed that under it agreements might be concluded with some of the specialised agencies which would confer on the General Assembly the responsibility for voting their budgets. In this context the expression "a consolidated budget" has often been used. Such a system would have advantages, since it would enable the Members of the United Nations to consider and vote, at one time and in one place, the Budget of the Organisation and of the agencies within the consolidated system. It would also simplify the complicated process of the examination of the budgets prepared by the agencies and reduce the number of operations necessary before a budget is finally adopted. Under such a system the budget estimates would naturally be initially prepared by each agency and the same arrangements for examination, e.g., by the Supervisory Committee of the General Assembly, would be

made as for the budget of the United Nations itself, except that the examination would be made in consultation with representatives of the specialised agencies concerned. It will be noted that the League of Nations and the International Labour Organisation had a similar financial arrangement which was satisfactory.

31. There are, however, certain difficulties in realising the advantages of a consolidated budget. In the first place, the constitutions of most, if not all, of the specialised agencies would need to be amended in order to enable provision to be made in the agreements empowering the General Assembly to vote their budgets. It would be clearly undesirable to delay the conclusion of the agreements pending the amendment of the constitutions. It follows from this that the desired provision would have to be omitted in the initial agreements with those specialised agencies which would need to submit amendments on this subject to member governments for approval. Alternatively, it could be provided that the relevant clause in the initial agreements would become operative only upon the entry into force of the constitutional amendment.

32. In the second place, the membership of the specialised agencies and the United Nations is not identical. This difference in membership might be taken care of through the establishment of a procedure whereby the section of the budget relating to each specialised agency would be initially voted only by the states members of that agency. Thus, when the Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the General Assembly was dealing with the budgets of the specialised agencies Members of the United Nations who are not members of a particular specialised agency would not participate in the consideration of the budget of that agency. On the other hand, arrangements would need to be effected to enable states not members of the United Nations to participate in the consideration of the budgets of the specialised agencies to which they belong. Arrangements of this kind have been made in the past, for example, in the case of the International Labour Organisation, and have proved to be satisfactory. Following such initial action on the budget of each agency, the consolidated budget of the United Nations and the agencies included therein could then be finally approved by the General Assembly in plenary session.

33. While the establishment of a consolidated system to cover as many as possible of the specialised agencies is to be regarded as a desirable objective, it is recognised that a system embracing all agencies may not be practicable. The agreement with an agency cannot include as an essential condition the provision that its budget be made a part of the consolidated system. Members of the United Nations should, however, consider the possibility of framing the constitutions of any new agencies which may be created in such a way as to enable those agencies to come within the consolidated system.

34. As indicated in paragraph 27 above, there are other types of financial arrangements which may be made. For example, it is considered that paragraph 3 of Article 17 would permit the voting of special grants or subventions to a specialised agency when, in the judgment of the General Assembly, such a specialised agency is best qualified to carry out a new programme of international co-operation for the United Nations.

Common Fiscal Services.

35. There would be many advantages in providing for common fiscal services to be performed by the Secretariat for the United Nations and the specialised agencies. One such service might be the collection of contributions due from Members of the United Nations for all those agencies in which they participate. Although the budget of some of these agencies might be voted by their respective constitutional organs, the United Nations would be responsible for notifying each Member of its share of the expenses of all agencies in which it participates, and for receiving payments from them. In addition to this, the United Nations could perform other fiscal services for the related agencies, such as the administration of balances and special funds, auditing, etc. It is proposed that this subject be studied by a group of experts appointed by the Organisation. This group might also prepare a draft of the financial regulations suitable for a fiscal system of the kind proposed. The provisions to be included in the agreements with the specialised agencies should be based on the result of this study.

Personnel Arrangements.

36. With a view to promoting close and harmonious working relationships among the several specialised agencies and the Organisation, certain common standards with regard to recruitment, conditions of service, classification, pensions and like matters should be agreed upon, and that arrangements should be made to permit interchanges of staff. The desirability of establishing common personnel standards and providing for interchanges of staff has already been foreseen by certain intergovernmental agencies whose constitutions authorise the conclusion of agreements with other public international organisations on this subject.

37. While it is agreed that the eventual development of a single unified international civil service is desirable from the standpoint of effective administrative co-ordination, the initial negotiations with the specialised agencies should be limited to seeking agreement on common standards, and arrangements for interchanges of staff. This in itself will be a difficult task, and will require careful study by experts drawn from both the Organisation and the specialised agencies. The initial objective might be the development of a set of staff regulations which could be adopted by the specialised agencies, subject to such variations as might be necessary to take account of special situations.

Privileges and Immunities.

38. Harmonious relationships between the specialised agencies and the Organisation will be facilitated if the arrangements for the grant of privileges and immunities are such as to avoid inequitable differentiation in the treatment of personnel. In this connection, it may not be necessary for the specialised agencies to enjoy in every respect the same privileges and immunities accorded to the United Nations. There are, however, certain matters relating particularly to the treatment and conditions of service of the personnel of international organisations in which differentiation between officials of similar status engaged on similar work would be likely to give rise to difficulties. In this connection attention is directed to the following examples:-

(a) Taxation. It appears necessary to consider the position

which arises where nationals of certain states are subject to taxation by their respective governments while nationals of other states are exempt. A wide variation between the effective salaries of persons on identical salary scales would, amongst other things, clearly limit the possibilities of interchanges of staff.

(b) International Passport. The institution of an international passport available to officials of the United Nations and related agencies is proposed in Part III Chapter V. Such a passport would enable Governments to afford like treatment to officials of similar status.

Administrative Tribunal.

39. It is anticipated that there will be established an administrative tribunal, not unlike that established by the League of Nations in 1927, to hear complaints and settle disputes concerning the terms of employment of officials. In conformity with the views expressed in paragraphs 36 and 37, it is clearly desirable that there should be only one such tribunal for the United Nations and for the specialised agencies and that agreements to this effect should be made with the agencies.

Technical Services.

40. In so far as the headquarters of the United Nations and those of the specialised agencies are located in a single centre, a large number of technical secretarial services could be unified. These technical services might include editorial services, printing, translation and interpretation, information and news services, and specially-trained staffs for the organisation of conferences. It is clear that the centralisation of these services would result in a reduction of overhead costs and increase the operating efficiency of the various agencies.

Central Statistical Service.

41. While it is recognised that in many cases the specialised agencies will wish to maintain their own statistical services, the establishment of a central statistical service in the Secretariat of the United Nations would be of great value not only to the United Nations, but also to the specialised agencies themselves and to member governments. A careful study would need to be made concerning the organisation and operation of such a service in order that it might supplement the services and meet the requirements of all interested bodies. The establishment of such a service would tend to reduce requests to governments by specialised agencies and organs of the United Nations for identical information and at the same time would result in the development of a comprehensive collection of statistical information in the economic and social fields.

Location of Headquarters.

42. It is considered that the Economic and Social Council, in its negotiations with the specialised agencies, should, with a view to securing the advantages which flow from centralisation, make the location of the headquarters of these agencies a point of major importance. However, the undoubted advantages following from centralisation must be weighed against the factors which, in certain

instances, may operate in favour of locating the headquarters of an agency in a place which is particularly suited to the discharge of its functions. The possibility of making exceptions to the general principle of centralisation has been recognised.
